Luck and Manipulation Cases
A Response to Professor Haji
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14109366 |
|---|---|
| Authors | N Levy (0000-0002-5679-1986, Macquarie University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 633-646 |
| Publication date | 2015-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217315001018 |
| OpenAlex | W2607139477 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 12 |
In his paper published in this issue, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that the challenge to compatibilism from luck is not novel. Rather, the challenge is identical to that from manipulation cases, and compatibilists already have responses to that challenge. In response, I distinguish two different luck problems for compatibilism. One challenge is seen in manipulation cases, but the challenge he identifies is different from the challenge from manipulation. The luck problem is therefore novel, and the existing solutions to the challenge from manipulation fail to address it
Compatibilism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Luck · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,13 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2018 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |