Luck, Compatibilism, and Libertarianism

Bibliographic Data

ID9687426
AuthorsIshtiyaque Haji (0000-0001-7973-3028, University of Calgary, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume54
Issue4
Pages611-631
Publication date2015-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217315000682
OpenAlexW2605472906
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited25

Many have thought that libertarian accounts of free action succumb to a problem about luck. Recently, it has been proposed that compatibilist accounts, which unlike libertarian ones, maintain that free action and determinism are compatible, are also vulnerable to a problem about luck. In this paper, I argue that the problem of compatibilist luck is not novel insofar as it is one manifestation of a more general concern to which compatibilists and libertarians have responded. Furthermore, these responses are not effective responses to the problem of libertarian luck

Action (physics) · Compatibilism · Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Indeterminism · Law and economics · Libertarianism · Luck · Physics · Quantum mechanics · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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