Defeasible a Priori Justification
A Reply to Thurow
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14430979 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Albert Casullo (University of Nebraska–Lincoln, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 231 |
| Pages | 336-343 |
| Publication date | 2008-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.512.x |
| OpenAlex | W2069160441 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
Joshua Thurow offers a defence of the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non‐experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. He responds to an objection which I make against this claim, and offers two arguments in support of his own position. I show that Thurow's response misconstrues my objection, and that his supporting arguments fall short of their goal
A priori and a posteriori · Defeasible estate · Economics · Epistemology · Experiential learning · Law and economics · Political science · Position (finance) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Highly cited | No |
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