Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3121273 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joshua Thurow, Joshua C Thurow (0000-0003-3518-0905, University of Wisconsin–Madison, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 225 |
| Pages | 596-602 |
| Publication date | 2006-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.461.x |
| OpenAlex | W1991508568 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 1 |
In his recent book Albert Casullo rejects the claim that if a belief is defeasible by non‐experiential evidence then it is defeasible by experiential evidence. This claim is a crucial premise in a simple argument for the experiential defeasibility of a priori justification. I defend the premise against Casullo's objection, the main problem with which is that he does not take into account the evidential role of multiple corroborating sources of testimony. I conclude that the crucial premise is true and that the simple argument is sound; thus many of our a priori justified beliefs are experientially defeasible
A priori and a posteriori · Argument (complex analysis) · Defeasible estate · Defeasible reasoning · Epistemology · Experiential learning · Omniscience · Premise · Simple (philosophy) · Skepticism · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2008 - 2022 (15) |
| Highly cited | No |