Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism
A Response to Cameron
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14430987 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Efird (0000-0001-5935-1938, University of York), Tom Stoneham (0000-0001-5490-4927, University of York) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 234 |
| Pages | 132-137 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.588.x |
| OpenAlex | W2041894525 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of ‘concrete’. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Equivocation · Metaphysics · Nihilism · Premise · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |