David Efird
Biographic Data
| ID | 5911673 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Efird |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Efird |
| SIGNATURE | EFIRD D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of York |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5935-1938 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
After Pascal’s Wager: On religious belief, regulated and rationally held
Non-evidential believing and permissivism about evidence: A reply to Dan-Johan Eklund
In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p 's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case …
Experiencing Christian art
In this article, we argue that a secularist cannot experience Christian art in the same way that a Christian can. To defend this claim, we argue that Christian faith is best conceived as an engagement with God, such that coming to have faith is a transformative, second-person experience where a person comes to know what it is like to be loved by God and that Christian art is best conceived as iconic, such that it is an occasion for, and a mode of…
Critical Review of Eleonore Stump's Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering
In her widely acclaimed Wandering in Darkness, Stump (2010) argues that the suffering of mentally fully functioning adult humans can be explained by God's love for them, a love which consists of a twofold desire for their good and for union with them. This love, then, constitutes a morally sufficient reason for God's allowing suffering, even horrendous suffering, and so serves either as a defence against the evidential problem of evil or a theodi…
Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron
Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of ‘concrete’. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions
The Subtraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass
No prominent works on this page.
Justifying Metaphysical Nihilism: A Response to Cameron
Ross Cameron charges the subtraction argument for metaphysical nihilism with equivocation: each premise is plausible only under different interpretations of ‘concrete’. This charge is ungrounded; the argument is both valid and supported by basic modal intuitions
The Subtraction Argument for the Possibility of Free Mass
Experiencing Christian art
In this article, we argue that a secularist cannot experience Christian art in the same way that a Christian can. To defend this claim, we argue that Christian faith is best conceived as an engagement with God, such that coming to have faith is a transformative, second-person experience where a person comes to know what it is like to be loved by God and that Christian art is best conceived as iconic, such that it is an occasion for, and a mode of…
Critical Review of Eleonore Stump's Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering
In her widely acclaimed Wandering in Darkness, Stump (2010) argues that the suffering of mentally fully functioning adult humans can be explained by God's love for them, a love which consists of a twofold desire for their good and for union with them. This love, then, constitutes a morally sufficient reason for God's allowing suffering, even horrendous suffering, and so serves either as a defence against the evidential problem of evil or a theodi…
Non-evidential believing and permissivism about evidence: A reply to Dan-Johan Eklund
In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p 's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case …
After Pascal’s Wager: On religious belief, regulated and rationally held
Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Theology (3 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Medicine (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Nothing (2 works)