Non-evidential believing and permissivism about evidence
A reply to Dan-Johan Eklund
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20312976 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joshua Cockayne (0000-0002-1545-8247, University of York, corresponding author), David Efird (0000-0001-5935-1938, University of York, corresponding author), Daniel Molto (0000-0002-2384-1668, University of York, corresponding author), RICHARD TAMBURRO, Richard Anthony Stuart Tamburro (corresponding author), Jack Warman (0000-0001-6447-4158, University of York, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 87-95 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412515000517 |
| OpenAlex | W2585343996 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 7 |
In response to John Bishop's (2007) account of passionally caused believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is (conceptually) impossible, that is, it's (conceptually) impossible consciously to believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn't support p 's being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In this article, we present Eklund's case against Bishop's account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it's unpersuasive, at least to those who accept permissivism about evidence, that is, that it's possible for there to be more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. We do this through a novel application of a case of nurtured belief, that is, of a person holding a belief simply because she was caused to do so by her upbringing, and we use it to show exactly where Eklund's argument goes wrong. We conclude by drawing a general lesson drawn from this debate: if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent with non-evidential believing being possible
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,4 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2023 (3) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |