Explanation = Unification? A New Criticism of Friedman’s Theory and a Reply to an Old One

Dados Bibliográficos

ID14432403
AutoresWilliam Roche (0000-0002-0135-0788, Texas Christian University), Elliott Sober (0000-0003-3130-1263, University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Ano2017
Volume84
Fascículo3
Páginas391-413
Data de publicação2017-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1086/692140
OpenAlexW2603715374
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas34

According to Michael Friedman’s theory of explanation, a law X explains laws Y 1 , Y 2 , ..., Y n precisely when X unifies the Y ’s, where unification is understood in terms of reducing the number of independently acceptable laws. Philip Kitcher criticized Friedman’s theory but did not analyze the concept of independent acceptability. Here we show that Kitcher’s objection can be met by modifying an element in Friedman’s account. In addition, we argue that there are serious objections to the use that Friedman makes of the concept of independent acceptability

Criticism · Economics · Element (criminal law) · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Political science · Unification · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Probability and Statistical Research