Moral Dilemmas and the God of Christianity

Philosophical‐Theological Investigations

Bibliographic Data

ID14760797
AuthorsEdmund N Santurri (0009-0005-0491-2714, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume53
Issue1
Pages10-44
Publication date2025-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Religious Ethics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0384-9694 • E-ISSN: 1467-9795
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/jore.12494
OpenAlexW4409902596
LanguageEN
References cited28

My central contention is that Christian ethics should rule out the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas, where “moral dilemma” signifies a situation in which all courses of action available to an agent are morally wrong. The reason for the exclusion is that the existence of a genuine moral dilemma would signify a conflict in the divine will that confirms, warrants, or constitutes moral requirement according to Christian ethics. A genuine moral dilemma would indicate that God commands incompatible courses of action and, therefore, commands the impossible. A reasonable, loving, providential God does not command the impossible. Along the way, I criticize standard “phenomenological” arguments employed by both secular moral philosophers and Christian ethicists in support of dilemmas and show where other arguments of dilemmas‐affirming Christian ethicists go wrong

Christianity · Epistemology · Philosophical theology · Theology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Religious studies · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification

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