Remarques d’inspiration phénoménologique sur la phénoménalité du virtuel

Some phenomenologically inspired remarks on the phenomenal aspect of the virtual. This article attempts to give a phenomenologically-inspired description of the specific sort of phenomenality that is produced by Virtual Reality (VR), and in particular to distinguish it from so-called “ natural” perception and from imagination. This raises a number of fundamental philosophical issues, such as the opposition between reality and illusion ; the phenomenological approach adopted here seeks to find in the “ thing itself” which is described the means to overcome this sort of opposition. In the course of this description, we are led : 1) to insist on the fact that VR does seem to require abandoning the representational paradigm ; 2) to specify the status of the lived body and lived experience in virtual environments, 3) to emphasize that reality is “ that which resists”, and that the genericity of virtual entities is decisive as a criterion for distinguishing between VR and the phenomenality of natural perception

Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Human–computer interaction · Illusion · Perception · sort · Virtual reality · Computer Science · History · Philosophy · Psychology · Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts