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State Franchise Laws, Dealer Terminations, and the Auto Crisis

Bibliographic Data

ID14855412
AuthorsFrancine Lafontaine (0000-0001-5268-5097, University of Michigan), Fiona Scott Morton (School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut; National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.)
Year2010
Volume24
Issue3
Pages233-250
Publication date2010-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Journal of Economic Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0895-3309 • E-ISSN: 1944-7965
PublisherAmerican Economic Association (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1257/jep.24.3.233
OpenAlexW1972227264
LanguageEN
References cited14

In fall 2008, General Motors and Chrysler were both on the brink of bankruptcy, and Ford was not far behind. As the government stepped in and restructuring began, GM and Chrysler announced their plan to terminate about 2,200 dealerships. In this paper, we first provide an overview of franchising in car distribution, how it came about, and the legal framework within which it functions. States earn about 20 percent of all state sales taxes from auto dealers. As a result, new car dealerships, and especially local or state car dealership associations, have been able to exert influence over local legislatures. This has led to a set of state laws that almost guarantee dealership profitability and survival—albeit at the expense of manufacturer profits. Available evidence and theory suggests that as a result of these laws, distribution costs and retail prices are higher than they otherwise would be; and this is particularly true for Detroit's Big Three car manufacturers—which is likely a factor contributing to their losses in market share vis-à-vis other manufacturers. After discussing the evidence on the effects of the car franchise laws on dealer profit and car prices, we turn to the interaction of the franchise laws and manufacturers' response to the auto crisis. Last, we consider what car distribution might be like if there were no constraints on organization. We conclude that although the state-level franchise laws came about for a reason, the current crisis perhaps provides an opportunity to reconsider the kind of regulatory framework that would best serve consumers, rather than carmakers or car dealers

Bankruptcy · Business · Economics · Legislature · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Profitability index · Restructuring · Franchising Strategies and Performance · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis · Finance

  • Franchising in America

    David B Sicilia, Thomas S Dicke•Journal of American History•1993

  • The Development of the Franchise Distribution System in the U.S. Automobile Industry

    Open Access•Thomas G Marx•The Business History Review•1985

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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