Using Game Theory to Resolve the “Chicken and Egg” Situation in Promoting Cellulosic Bioenergy Development
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14860960 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yi Luo (0000-0002-6343-4127, University of Michigan, corresponding author), Shelie A Miller (0000-0003-0379-3993, University of Michigan) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 135 |
| Pages | 29-41 |
| Publication date | 2017-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ecological Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0921-8009 • E-ISSN: 1873-6106 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.013 |
| OpenAlex | W2582780753 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 30 |
Agricultural economics · Agronomy · Bioenergy · Biofuel · Biorefinery · Business · Cellulosic ethanol · Commit · Economics · Environmental economics · Incentive · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Natural resource economics · Renewable energy · Bioenergy crop production and management · Computer Science · Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure · Energy and Environment Impacts · Engineering · Biotechnology
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| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |