Reason, reasoning, and the taking condition
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 14949484 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hamid Vahid (0000-0001-9064-0877, School of Analytic Philosophy Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM) Tehran Iran, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 123-133 |
| Publication date | 2025-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ejop.12917 |
| OpenAlex | W4390746120 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 21 |
Theoretical reasoning (inference) is a conscious personal‐level activity and a causal process. It is the process of revising one's beliefs for a reason whereby some of our beliefs cause or result in other beliefs. But inference is more than mere causation. This raises the question of what exactly distinguishes theoretical reasoning from mere causal processes. Paul Boghossian has located the distinguishing feature of inference in, what he calls, the “taking condition” requirement (TC). It turns out, however, that all attempts to explain this notion fail. In this paper, I shall offer an indirect argument for the taking condition grounded in a specific account of the structure of epistemic reasons that distinguishes two levels of epistemic normativity, namely, the possession and justification levels. I show how such an account can legitimize the role of (TC) in reasoning and deflect the standard objections raised against it. Finally, I explain how this proposal naturally accommodates the defeasibility of reasoning
Analytic reasoning · Causal inference · Causal reasoning · Causation · Cognition · Deductive reasoning · Defeasible estate · Defeasible reasoning · Epistemology · Inference · Philosophy of science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |