Dispositions and Antidotes

Bibliographic Data

ID4859153
AuthorsAnthony Bird (0000-0002-6244-1579, Dartmouth College, corresponding author), Alexander Bird
Year1998
Volume48
Issue191
Pages227-234
Publication date1998-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1467-9213.00098
OpenAlexW2046781516
LanguageEN
Citations received81
References cited3

Charlie Martin has shown that the simple conditional analysis of dispositional concepts (x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s) is in error. This is due to finkish dispositions which are caused to disappear by the stimulus s. David Lewis has proposed an improved analysis which takes account of finkish dispositions by requiring that the appropriate causal bias remains for a sufficiently long time. In this paper I argue that Lewis's anlysis also fails. This is because of the possibility of antidotes. An antidote to a disposition interferes with its normal operation so that, although the disposition and it causal basis remain, the solution does not bring about the usual response. I consider several possible defences of Lewis's analysis and a plausible repair, but find these unsatisfactory. I conclude that an analysis of disposition concepts is not available because an unavoidable indexical element (e.g. reference to normal circumstances) is present in explanations of these concepts. In this regard, and others, they may be thought of as akin to theoretical or natural kind concepts

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