Belief and settledness

Bibliographic Data

ID21335722
AuthorsWooram Lee (0000-0002-4154-1984, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen Essen, Germany, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume66
Issue6
Pages1094-1119
Publication date2023-07-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInquiry (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0020174x.2020.1772865
OpenAlexW3032372617
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited37

This paper elucidates the sense in which belief is a question-settling attitude. In her recent work, Jane Friedman suggests that we understand the settledness of belief in terms of a normative principle about belief and inquiry: one ought not inquire into a question and believe the answer to the question at the same time. On the basis of the distinction between dispositional and occurrent belief, I argue against Friedman that there is no principle linking belief and inquiry that is both plausible and normative: on the dispositional reading of ‘belief’, such a principle is implausible; on the occurrent reading of ‘belief’, such a principle is not normative. I argue instead that the settledness should be understood as a descriptive relation between occurrent belief and inquiry: one cannot inquire into whether p while at the same time occurrently believing that p

Epistemology · Normative · Reading (process) · Relation (database) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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