Constitucionalismo débil = Weak-form judicial review
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 16945396 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mariano C Melero De La Torre (0000-0002-7128-2119, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Pages | 198-210 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | EUNOMÍA Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2253-6655 • E-ISSN: 2253-6655 |
| Publisher | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (PUBLISHER • ES) |
| DOI | 10.20318/eunomia.2017.3814 |
| OpenAlex | W2760349209 |
| Language | ES |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
Se suele denominar constitucionalismo “fuerte” al tipo de justicia constitucional predominante después de la segunda gran posguerra, el cual se caracteriza por otorga a los jueces (o a un tribunal especializado) el poder para inaplicar y/o invalidar aquellas leyes que los tribunales consideran contrarias a su interpretación de los derechos protegidos, pudiendo el legislador revocar o modificar las determinaciones judiciales únicamente mediante las mayorías cualificadas que se incluyen en un proceso formal de reforma constitucional. En esta entrada se presentan y discuten varias formas de constitucionalismo “débil”, cuyo rasgo distintivo común consiste en tratar de asegurar la primacía de los derechos básicos sobre el resto del ordenamiento jurídico (incluso mediante su “atrincheramiento” formal), sin asumir la supremacía de los jueces constitucionales en su interpretación. La discusión girará en torno a cuál es el significado preciso de la “debilitación” de los jueces constitucionales y, en consecuencia, cuál debería considerarse la forma más deseable para su articulación institucional.Palabras clave: Supremacía judicial, constitucionalismo débil, revisión judicial basada en derechos, deferencia debida.Abstract: The kind of constitutional justice which has been globally dominant since the end of the Second World War is usually termed ‘strong’ constitutionalism. It gives judges (or a specialized tribunal) the power to strike down legislation that they consider incompatible with their interpretation of those rights and, simultaneously, allows the legislature to override those judicial determinations only by gaining the qualified majorities included in a formal amending process. This entry expounds and discusses some ‘weak’ forms of judicial review, whose common distinctive character is aiming to ensure the supremacy of the basic rights over the rest of the legal system (even with their formal “entrenchment”), without assuming the judicial supremacy in their interpretation. The discussion will revolve around the precise sense of the “weakening” of the courts in a rights-based constitutional review, and which institutional design should be considered its most desirable form.Keywords: Judicial supremacy, weak-form judicial review, rights-based judicial review, due deference
Constitutionalism · Democracy · Humanities · Political science · Tribunal · Comparative constitutional jurisprudence studies · Criminal Justice and Penology · Law · Legal processes and jurisprudence · Philosophy
The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such a Bad Thing after All)
Constitucionalismo débil = Weak-form judicial review
The Supreme Court on Trial
The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism Notwithstanding
Judicial Restraint in the Pursuit of Justice
Constitutions and Political Theory
Ulysses Unbound
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,11 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |