Vetting for Virtue
Democracy’s Challenge in Excluding Criminals from Office
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19213397 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sigurd S Arntzen (0009-0005-9259-9819, BI Norwegian Business School, corresponding author), Jon H Fiva (0000-0002-9170-4964, BI Norwegian Business School, corresponding author), Rune J Sørensen (0000-0003-0375-7677, BI Norwegian Business School, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Pages | 1-20 |
| Publication date | 2024-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055426101634 |
| OpenAlex | W4404678242 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 48 |
How effective are democratic systems in preventing individuals with criminal backgrounds from holding political office? We investigate this question for the case of Norway, which has no legal restrictions against felons running for office. We analyze local election candidates from 2003 to 2019, paired with administrative records of criminal offenses. We demonstrate that individuals with criminal records are systematically penalized at every stage of their political careers. Candidates are less likely to have criminal records than the general population, with elected officials less likely to have criminal backgrounds than their unelected peers, and mayors being the most lawful. In Norway’s flexible-list PR system—where parties rank candidates and voters can cast personal votes for preferred candidates—our evidence shows that party gatekeeping accounts for most filtering, while personal votes contribute little at the margin
Democracy · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Vetting · Virtue · Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis · Criminal Law and Evidence · Law · Public Administration · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |