Firm Influence in International Organizations
The Case of OECD Tax Evasion Regulations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19213613 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Margaret A T Kenney (0000-0001-7881-2111, University of California System, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Publication date | 2026-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123426101434 |
| OpenAlex | W7155570179 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 43 |
Within political institutions insulated from money in politics and domestic electoral considerations, to what extent are non-state actors able to influence regulations? Many international organizations (IOs) are composed only of state members, but their regulations have far-reaching consequences for non-state actors. This paper sheds new light on the influence of non-state actors, particularly firms, on regulations, with a focus on the case of OECD tax evasion regulations. I argue that firms and industry associations work to build positive reputations with bureaucrats through broad-based and high-quality written public comments to further their policy preferences. I present evidence that bureaucrats make decisions in line with these expectations through quantitative analysis of a new dataset of 3,349 OECD public comments, natural language processing methods, and thirty-three in-depth interviews. The results indicate that stakeholder engagement may be a double-edged sword: while intended to democratize access to the policy-making process, even these fora are susceptible to strategic firm behavior. However, while well-resourced firms and associations are at an advantage in having their voice heard in the creation of regulations, smaller firms that invest substantially in the process can have an outsized influence. International taxation also represents a substantively important case of non-state actor influence given the successful co-ordination of 147 countries on new tax regulations
Evasion (ethics) · Politics · Process (computing) · Stakeholder · State (computer science) · Tax Evasion · Work (physics) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Taxation and Compliance Studies
Private Power, Public Law
International organizations in a new era of populist nationalism
Tax Evasion and Inequality
Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
Quiet Politics and Business Power
Transnational Advocacy over Time
Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Between Participation and Capture in International Rule-Making
The Power of Boilerplate
Competing for consultation
Lobbying strategies and success
Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union
Who to lobby and when
Interest Group Success in the European Union
Determinants of Upper-Class Dominance in the Heavenly Chorus
A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy
Balancing inside and outside lobbying
The Breakdown of Industrial Opposition to Trade
Legal Constraint in the US Courts of Appeals
Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons
Do Public Consultations Reduce Blame Attribution? The Impact of Consultation Characteristics, Gender, and Gender Attitudes
Populism and Backlashes against International Courts
Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process
Lobbying in the face of politicisation
Spillover Effects in International Law
The Enemy of My Enemy
The Unintended Consequences of Bilateralism
In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the Gatt/WTO
Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU
The Power of Institutions
NGO Influence in International Organizations
Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
Political Cleavages within Industry
Participation, Government Legitimacy, and Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Economies
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |