Remembering as inverse causal inference

Bibliographic Data

ID19234635
AuthorsFelipe De Brigard (0000-0003-0169-1360, Duke University, corresponding author)
Year2026
Pages1-34
Publication date2026-03-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2026.2650495
OpenAlexW7144007607
LanguageEN
References cited82

The causalism/simulationism debate has become central in contemporary philosophy of memory. Recently, however, I have suggested that the debate is largely ill-construed and have offered instead a particular view of memory reconstruction that, I think, can reconcile a causal and a simulationist view of remembering. The current paper seeks to elaborate on that suggestion by pursuing two aims. The first one is to clearly articulate why the debate between causalism and simulationism is ill-construed. The second aim is to show how the version of remembering I defend can provide an answer to the causal question that makes causation central to the nature of memory, but in a way that is different from how it features in the causalism/simulationism debate

Causal inference · Causal model · Causal reasoning · Causal structure · Causation · Inference · Philosophy of mind · Philosophy of science · Child and Animal Learning Development · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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