Radicalizing simulationism

Remembering as imagining the (nonpersonal) past

Bibliographic Data

ID21591769
AuthorsKourken Michaelian (0000-0002-5205-3046, Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes; Institut Universitaire de France, Grenoble, France, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume37
Issue5
Pages1170-1196
Publication date2024-07-03
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/09515089.2022.2082934
OpenAlexW4281797696
LanguageEN
Citations received26
References cited51

On the simulation theory of memory, to remember is to imagine an event from the personal past. McCarroll has recently argued that, because it implies not only that a genuine memory need not be caused by the rememberer’s experience of the remembered event but also that the rememberer need not even have experienced that event, simulationism is unable, first, to explain infantile amnesia (the inability to remember events that occurred in one’s early childhood) and, second, to rule out certain “impossible” memories (namely, memories of events that occurred before one was born). Responding to McCarroll, this paper argues that simulationism is in fact able to explain infantile amnesia but concedes that it is unable to rule out pre-birth memories. It goes on to argue, however, that, rather than leading us to reject the theory, this should lead us to endorse a radicalized simulationism on which to remember is simply to imagine an event from the past, regardless of whether that event belongs to the personal past

Amnesia · Autobiographical memory · Childhood amnesia · Childhood memory · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Episodic memory · Epistemology · Psychoanalysis · Recall · History · Identity, Memory, and Therapy · Memory and Neural Mechanisms · Memory Processes and Influences · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology

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