Comitology and Delegation System in the European Union
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19367199 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nikolay Kaveshnikov (0000-0003-0223-1083, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 106 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 5-16 |
| Publication date | 2021-11-30 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Contemporary Europe (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0201-7083 • E-ISSN: 0201-7083 |
| Publisher | The Russian Academy of Sciences (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.15211/soveurope620210516 |
| OpenAlex | W4200499808 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
The article addresses the system of comitology and delegation in the European Union. It explores such issues like evolution of comitology, contemporary procedures of the control over the European Commission in the process of elaboration of implementing and delegated acts, preferences of legislators regarding control procedures, factors determining the final choice among these procedures. The article shows that the system is based on the “police patrol” model.Should we consider the comitology / delegation procedures as a mechanism of control or discussion (deliberation)? This question is of the greatest theoretical interest. The purpose of this article is to show based on the existing empirical studies, the actual preferences of EU institutions when choosing the procedures of comitology/delegation and the factors influencing the final decision. The article demonstrates that both prior to and after the Lisbon Treaty, the preferences of institutions in choosing procedures differ significantly and can be largely explained by the goal of maximizing their own influence. An empirical analysis of the results of the final choice of procedures demonstrates that the main factors that push toward stricter control procedures are institutional conflict and the complexity of the issue under discussion. These preferences and factors of the choice of procedures allow to conclude that the EU institutions consider the system of comitology and delegation primarily as a mechanism of control over the Commission in the logic of the principal-agent theory
Commission · Computer security · Delegation · Deliberation · Economics · European commission · European union · International trade · Law and economics · Management · Political science · Treaty · Computer Science · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law
Sidelined Member States
Lobbying in the EU Comitology System
Comitology Choices in the Eu Legislative Process
Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving
Controlling delegated powers in the post-Lisbon European Union
Legislative Control over Executive Law‐making
Delegation, Comitology, and the Separation of Powers in the European Union
Delegating Powers in the European Community
Comitology
The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology
Comitology
The origins of the EU comitology system
Comitology
Negotiating the Post‐Lisbon Comitology System
Legislative Control of Powers Delegated to the Executive
Control of the Commission's Executive Functions
Congressional Oversight Overlooked
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |