Negotiating the Post‐Lisbon Comitology System
Institutional Battles over Delegated Decision‐Making
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6279002 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gijs Jan Brandsma (0000-0002-0631-4786, Utrecht University), Jens Blom-Hansen (0000-0002-7148-0334, Aarhus University), Jens Blom‐hansen |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 939-957 |
| Publication date | 2012-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | JCMS Journal of Common Market Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-9886 • E-ISSN: 1468-5965 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02294.x |
| OpenAlex | W2133628771 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 21 |
The Lisbon Treaty represented a rare opportunity to redesign parliamentary control of the European Commission's delegated powers. The new Treaty distinguishes between delegated and implementing acts and specifies that comitology rules must be decided by a co‐decision regulation. This necessitated a reform of the comitology system, which was decided in December 2010 after protracted inter‐institutional negotiations. This article asks why the new control system took its final form. The negotiations as a game of control positions are analyzed and the course of the negotiations is traced through documents and interviews. Support is found for the article's hypotheses, but it is also the case that events in some respects went further than expected
Commission · Control (management · Economics · European commission · European union · International trade · Law and economics · Management · Negotiation · Political science · Treaty · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Systems and Governance · Public Administration
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| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,15 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2024 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |