Discerning Solution Concepts for Discrete Games

Bibliographic Data

ID19418220
AuthorsNail Kashaev (0000-0002-2326-7352, Department of Economics, Western University, London, ON, Canada, corresponding author), Bruno Salcedo (Department of Economics, Western University, London, ON, Canada)
Year2021
Volume39
Issue4
Pages1001-1014
Publication date2021-10-02
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Business and Economic Statistics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0735-0015 • E-ISSN: 1537-2707
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/07350015.2020.1753525
OpenAlexW3015570682
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited30

The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for the identification of payoff parameters, but also for the validity and informativeness of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. We say that a solution concept is discernible if it is possible to determine whether it generated the observed data on the players’ behavior and covariates. We propose a set of conditions that make it possible to discern solution concepts. In particular, our conditions are sufficient to tell whether the players’ choices emerged from Nash equilibria. We can also discriminate between rationalizable behavior, maxmin behavior, and collusive behavior. Finally, we identify the correlation structure of unobserved shocks in our model using a novel approach

Counterfactual thinking · Covariate · Econometrics · Mathematical economics · Nash equilibrium · Solution concept · Stochastic game · Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics

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