Tournament Winner Proportion and its Effect on Effort
An Investigation of the Underlying Psychological Mechanisms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19447187 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Thorsten Knauer (0000-0002-2734-9996, Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany), Friedrich Sommer (0000-0002-7697-2864, University of Münster, Munster, Germany), Arnt Wöhrmann (0000-0003-4157-5401, Giessen University, Giessen, Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 681-702 |
| Publication date | 2017-10-02 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | European Accounting Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0963-8180 • E-ISSN: 1468-4497 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09638180.2016.1175957 |
| OpenAlex | W3124373110 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 32 |
This study investigates the effects of the psychological mechanisms activated by different proportions of tournament winners on effort. Using a real-effort experiment that allows the evolution of social comparison, which is central to our theory, we show that firms can increase employee effort (and performance) by increasing the proportion of winners. Based on a causal model, we generate evidence for our theory that this effect is driven by relative performance concerns and bonus concerns, both of which depend on the proportion of tournament winners. In addition, we find that, over time, the change in effort is more negative the lower the proportion of winners. This effect is driven by the different behaviors of winners and losers in a previous tournament
Econometrics · Economics · Microeconomics · Tournament · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Highly cited | No |