Corporate non-participation in the ASB standard-setting process

Bibliographic Data

ID19447461
AuthorsGeorge Georgiou (0000-0002-0676-5544, University of Aberdeen, corresponding author)
Year2002
Volume11
Issue4
Pages699-722
Publication date2002-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Accounting Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0963-8180 • E-ISSN: 1468-4497
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/0963818022000001028
OpenAlexW3123174418
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited26

The standard-setting process of the UK's Accounting Standards Board (ASB) can be examined from different theoretical frameworks. One considers it a political process where interested parties choose to lobby on the basis of lobbying costs and benefits accrued from successful lobbying. The examination of the motives of various parties to lobby or not is considered important for understanding the process. Another framework assumes a non-pluralistic process, dominated by a few powerful groups to the detriment of the interests of other groups which are effectively excluded from the process. Drawing from the first framework, this study examines the factors which influenced the choice of a sample of UK listed companies not to make a submission on the ASB's discussion paper proposals on deferred tax. A perception that their participation would not make a difference to the outcome of the process and reliance on their external auditors to represent their position were found to be the most important factors for not making a submission. In contrast, no support was found for the suggestion that agreement with the proposals is more likely to prompt a non-response than disagreement with the proposals

Audit · Business · Economics · Perception · Political science · Politics · Public relations · Accounting and Organizational Management · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Computer Science · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Law · Psychology · Accounting · Finance

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