Uncertainty and Intention

Bibliographic Data

ID19524920
AuthorsBenjamin Lennertz (0000-0003-2579-0793, Colgate University, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume25
Issue3
Pages580-607
Publication date2023-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061
PublisherJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.26556/jesp.v25i3.1968
OpenAlexW4387218536
LanguageEN
References cited45

Speakers typically use the sentence 'I will go to the store' to simultaneously express an intention to go to the store and a belief that they will go to the store. This is consonant with two popular theses about intentions: first, intending to j implies believing that one will j; second, intending to j commits one to j-ing. In this paper, I argue that at least one of these theses is false. I do so by exploring what speakers express when they utter a sentence with a slightly different form, like 'I will probably go to the store' in a typical situation. After laying down a framework for thinking about this sort of communication, I explore some different things speakers might express with this sentence in different situations. Most importantly, I argue that in some typical situations speakers express either ordinary intentions but not beliefs or partial intentions that don’t commit them to performing the intended action. Either way, at least one of the popular theses is false

Cognitive psychology · Commit · Epistemology · Linguistics · Sentence · sort · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Language, Discourse, Communication Strategies · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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