Rational Norms for Degreed Intention (and the Discrepancy between Theoretical and Practical Reason)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21293683 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jay Jian (0000-0002-8485-9087, National Tsing Hua University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 101 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 360-374 |
| Publication date | 2023-04-03 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Australasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00048402.2021.2019288 |
| OpenAlex | W4212972712 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 19 |
Given the success of the formal approach, within contemporary epistemology, to understanding degreed belief, some philosophers have recently considered its extension to the challenge of understanding intention. According to them, (1) intentions can also admit of degrees, as beliefs do, and (2) these degreed states are all governed by the norms of the probability calculus, such that the rational norms for belief and for intention exhibit certain structural similarity. This paper, however, raises some worries about (2). It considers two schemes for representing degreed intention, and casts some doubt on applying probabilistic norms to degreed intention on each scheme. And it argues that the norms of Intention–Belief Consistency and Enkrasia cannot plausibly be turned into norms prescribing a simple correspondence relation between one’s degrees of belief and intention. The results suggest a potential structural discrepancy between the norms of theoretical and practical rationality—at least for degreed belief and intention. This potential discrepancy not only raises interesting questions about the intention–belief relation and rational norms for degreed intention. It also poses a new challenge for intention-based expressivism about normative judgment and cognitivism about practical rationality
Consistency (knowledge bases) · Epistemology · Expressivism · Norm (philosophy) · Normative · Probabilistic logic · Rationality · Relation (database) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |