Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19525005 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Krister Bykvist (0000-0003-4370-7201, Stockholm University), Jonas Olson (0000-0001-8323-9882, Stockholm University) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 6 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 1-9 |
| Publication date | 2012-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061 |
| Publisher | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.26556/jesp.v6i2.63 |
| OpenAlex | W1580250123 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 11 |
Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for to account for normative certitude. We shall argue that the being for account of normative certitude is vulnerable to many problems shared by other noncognitivist theories. Furthermore, we shall argue that Sepielli’s account has its own problems: His favored normalization procedure for degrees of being for has highly problematic implications
Economics · Epistemology · Normative · Positive economics · Social science · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2024 (11) |
| Highly cited | No |