Expressivism and Moral Certitude
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351381 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Krister Bykvist (0000-0003-4370-7201), Jonas Olson (0000-0001-8323-9882) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 235 |
| Pages | 202-215 |
| Publication date | 2009-04-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.580.x |
| OpenAlex | W2079109796 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
Michael Smith has recently argued that non‐cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non‐cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non‐cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non‐cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non‐cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non‐cognitivism will succeed
Cognition · Cognitivism (psychology) · Epistemology · Expressivism · Ethics in medical practice · Philosophy · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · War, Ethics, and Justification
Epistemic Challenges to Moral Expressivism
Moral Uncertainty
Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists
Moral uncertainty, noncognitivism, and the multi‐objective story
Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
Ethics and the Question of What to Do
Quasi-realism and normative certitude
Normative certitude for expressivists
Expressivism and moral vagueness
Moral uncertainty
| Citations per year | 0.71 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2012 - 2025 (14) |
| Highly cited | No |