Algorithmic Decision-Making, Agency Costs, and Institution-Based Trust
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19562940 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Keith Dowding (0000-0001-6888-9369, Australian National University), Brad R Taylor (0000-0003-4375-6206, University of Southern Queensland, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2024-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy & Technology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2210-5433 • E-ISSN: 2210-5441 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1007/s13347-024-00757-5 |
| OpenAlex | W4399046485 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 61 |
Algorithm Decision Making (ADM) systems designed to augment or automate human decision-making have the potential to produce better decisions while also freeing up human time and attention for other pursuits. For this potential to be realised, however, algorithmic decisions must be sufficiently aligned with human goals and interests. We take a Principal-Agent (P-A) approach to the questions of ADM alignment and trust. In a broad sense, ADM is beneficial if and only if human principals can trust algorithmic agents to act faithfully on their behalf. This mirrors the challenge of facilitating P-A relationships among humans, but the peculiar nature of human-machine interaction also raises unique issues. The problem of asymmetric information is omnipresent but takes a different form in the context of ADM. Although the decision-making machinery of an algorithmic agent can in principle be laid bare for all to see, the sheer complexity of ADM systems based on deep learning models prevents straightforward monitoring. We draw on literature from economics and political science to argue that the problem of trust in ADM systems should be addressed at the level of institutions. Although the dyadic relationship between human principals and algorithmic agents is our ultimate concern, cooperation at this level must rest against an institutional environment which allows humans to effectively evaluate and choose among algorithmic alternatives
Business · Computer security · Economics · Epistemology · Institution · Knowledge management · Management science · Philosophy of science · Philosophy of technology · Political science · Blockchain Technology Applications and Security · Computer Science · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Innovation, Sustainability, Human-Machine Systems · Law · Artificial Intelligence
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Reasoning the fast and frugal way
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Stop explaining black box machine learning models for high stakes decisions and use interpretable models instead
A Theory of Yardstick Competition
Building Effective Online Marketplaces with Institution-Based Trust
Information and Efficiency
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Institutions Rule
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How humans impair automated deception detection performance
Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination
Extended Cognition and the Internet
Fair, Transparent, and Accountable Algorithmic Decision-making Processes
The psychological foundations of rational ignorance
Deep learning and principal–agent problems of algorithmic governance
Algorithmic bias
Information asymmetry favoring sellers
The Economics of Information
The Nature of the Firm
Rational Choice
"The Market for "Lemons
Revisionist Public Choice Theory
Complexity, economics, and public policy
Economic Perspectives on Government
On prediction in political science
Social impacts of algorithmic decision-making
How the machine 'thinks
The Social Control of Impersonal Trust
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |