Property Rights and Property Wrongs
How Power, Institutions, and Norms Shape Economic Conflict in Russia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19937367 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Timothy Frye (0000-0001-8633-2046, Columbia University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-24 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Property Rights and Property Wrongs (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/9781316661727 |
| OpenAlex | W2588914667 |
| Open Library | OL28629643M |
| ISBN | 9781316661727 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 26 |
| References cited | 129 |
Secure property rights are central to economic development and stable government, yet difficult to create. Relying on surveys in Russia from 2000 to 2012, Timothy Frye examines how political power, institutions, and norms shape property rights for firms. Through a series of sophisticated survey experiments, Property Rights and Property Wrongs explores how political power, personal connections, elections, concerns for reputation, legal facts, and social norms influence property rights disputes from hostile corporate takeovers to debt collection to renationalization. This work looks beyond high profile cases of economic conflict and departs from the common view that property rights in Russia are uniformly weak and driven solely by personal connections. The result is a nuanced view of the political economy of Russia that contributes to central debates in economic development, comparative politics, and legal studies
Economic power · Economic system · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Law and economics · Personal property · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Property (philosophy) · Property rights · Reputation · Sociology · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Russia and Soviet political economy · politics and government · Right of property · Russia
Либералы» versus «демократы»
Elite Capture
Hide and Protect
Beyond Political Connections
Partnerships for skill development in Russia
Encouraging skill development
Should I stay, or should I go? self-legitimacy of attorneys in an authoritarian state
The Oligarch Vanishes
Expectations matter
Imperial Legal Politics after the Age of Empires
Firm performance and regional economic freedom
Whispers of dissent? Analyzing the rhetorical alignment of the elites with the authoritarian incumbent through parliamentary discourse in the Kazakhstani Senate
Civil society and authoritarian regimes
Institutions under pressure
Capture Me If You Can
Post-communist predation
The politics of bank ownership and currency policies in Central and Eastern Europe
Redistributive policy and redistribution preferences
Stopping the feast in times of plague
Do elites matter in Russian foreign policy? The gap between self-perception and influence
Heterarchy
Property rights in Russia after 2009
Autocrats and Their Business Allies
Network Ties and the Politics of Renationalization
Why Corporate Political Connections Can Impede Investment
Authoritarian state capitalism
The key to the Asian miracle
Trust and governance
Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad
The Oligarchs
Economies in Transition
Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Non-Contractual Relations in Business
Property and Political Order in Africa
Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship
Judicial Review in New Democracies
Democracy and the Rule of Law
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Economic Analysis of Property Rights
Decentralized Authoritarianism in China
Rule by Law
Building States and Markets after Communism
The Rise of the Western World
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
The Formation of Beliefs
Field experiment estimate of electoral fraud in Russian parliamentary elections
The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development
Property Rights and Finance
Opting out of the Legal System
An Economic Analysis of a Drug-Selling Gang's Finances
Institutions and Economic Performance
Why Nations Fail
Culture matters
Governing the Commons
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution
Institutions, Property Rights, and Economic Growth
Factory and Manager in the USSR
Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities
Leaders and International Conflict
Violent Entrepreneurs
Property, Predation, and Protection
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
The Russian Mafia
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy
Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections
Not By Genes Alone
Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences
The Fox News Effect
Institutions and Economic Performance
Democracy and Redistribution
Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions
Are Russian commercial courts biased? Evidence from a bankruptcy law transplant
What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next
Of Rule and Revenue
The emergence of the rule of law in Russia
Revisiting the emergence of the rule of law in Russia
Suing Russia at Home
Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe
The evolution of business – state interaction in Russia
Watchdogs or attack dogs? The role of the Russian courts and the central election commission in the resolution of electoral disputes
Land tenure and investment incentives
Understanding institutional change
Justice in Moscow
Putin's Silovarchs
The Profits of Power
Property Rights and Investment Incentives
Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society
Constitutions and Commitment
A Constitution for Knaves Crowds out Civic Virtues
Ussr
The Moral Basis of a Backward Society
Explaining individual‐level support for privatization in European post‐Soviet economies
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
Shared Mental Models
The Sicilian Mafia
Why is Trade Reform So Popular in Latin America
Original Sin, Good Works, and Property Rights in Russia
The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government
Growth and Governance
Political and Economic Markets
Growth and Governance
Private Investment and the Institutionalization of Collective Action in Autocracies
Judicial alignment and criminal justice
Means of production versus means of coercion
Is Putin’s popularity real
Are Russian Judges Still Soviet
Suing the State in Russia
Faking performance together
Corporate raiding and the role of the state in Russia
Threats to Property Rights in Russia
Putting Yukos in Perspective
Property Rights, Democracy and Economic Growth
The Persuasive Power of Russian Courts
Fishing, Commitment, and Communication
Latin America's Lost Illusions
Invested interests
Elections under authoritarianism
Elections and Property Rights
If You’re Against Them You’re With Us
Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem
The Productivity Consequences of Political Turnover
Making the Most of Statistical Analyses
Civil Wars and Economic Growth
Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control
| Unique citing works | 26 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,6 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 24 |