The Productivity Consequences of Political Turnover
Firm‐Level Evidence from Ukraine's Orange Revolution
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232341 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John S Earle (0000-0001-8507-6685, George Mason University and Central European University), Scott Gehlbach (0000-0002-9689-0145, University of Wisconsin–Madison) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 708-723 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12170 |
| OpenAlex | W2328319044 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 34 |
We examine the impact of political turnover on economic performance in a setting of largely unanticipated political change and profoundly weak institutions: the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Exploiting census‐type panel data on over 7,000 manufacturing enterprises, we find that the productivity of firms in the regions most supportive of Viktor Yushchenko increased by more than 15 percentage points in the three years following his election, relative to that in the most anti‐Yushchenko regions. We conclude that this effect is driven primarily by particularistic rather than general economic policies that disproportionately increased output among large enterprises, government suppliers, and private enterprises—three types of firms that had much to gain or lose from turnover at the national level. Our results demonstrate that political turnover in the context of weak institutions can have substantial distributional effects that are reflected in economic productivity
Business · Census · Context (archaeology · Economic growth · Economics · Geography · Labour economics · Panel data · Political science · Politics · Productivity · Turnover · Corruption and Economic Development · Political Conflict and Governance · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,3 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 23 |