Corruption as a Last Resort
Adapting to the Market in Central Asia
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19986501 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kelly M Mcmann (0000-0002-7005-6339, Cornell University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Publication date | 2014-10-17 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Corruption as a Last Resort (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Cornell University Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.7591/cornell/9780801453274.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W4301479781 |
| Open Library | OL28357827M |
| ISBN | 9780801453274 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 17 |
Why do ordinary people engage in corruption? This book contends that bureaucrats, poverty, and culture do not force individuals in Central Asia to pay bribes, use connections, or sell political support. Rather, corruption is a last resort when relatives, groups in society, the market, and formal government programs cannot provide essential goods and services. This book shows that Islamic institutions, secular charities, entrepreneurs, and banks cannot provide the jobs and credit people need. This drives individuals to illicitly seek employment and loans from government officials. A leading cause of this resource scarcity is market reform, as demonstrated by analysis of these countries as well as of Uzbekistan and global data. Market reform without supporting institutions, such as credit registries and antimonopoly measures, limits the resources available from the market and societal groups. The book finds that in these circumstances only those individuals who have affluent relatives have an alternative to corruption. Focusing on ordinary people offers a new understanding of corruption. Previously, our knowledge was largely restricted to government officials' role in illicit exchanges. From the book's novel approach comes a useful policy insight: supplying ordinary people with alternatives to corruption is a fundamental and important anticorruption strategy
Business · Development economics · Economic growth · Economics · Government (linguistics) · Language change · Market economy · Political corruption · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Poverty · Scarcity · Corruption and Economic Development · Law · asia · Central · central, economic conditions · Corruption · Economic conditions · Police corruption · politics and government · Post-communism
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| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,18 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2024 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |