Time and Modality in Hegel’s Account of Judgment

Bibliographic Data

ID20043679
AuthorsPaul Redding (0000-0003-3368-4587, corresponding author)
Year2019
Pages91-109
Publication date2019-03-14
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueAct and Object of Judgment (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9780429435317-5
OpenAlexW2939376634
ISBN9780429435317
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited8

Since having been dismissed by Bertrand Russell in the early twentieth century, Hegel has rarely been considered as having views relevant for the core logical and metaphysical concerns of analytic philosophy. According to Russell, Hegel had an antiquated metaphysics that derived from a naïve acceptance of Aristotle’s subject-predicate conception of judgment—an approach that had been made redundant by the revolutionary work in logic by Frege. However, the grounds invoked by Russell for Hegel’s excommunication came into question when philosophers and logicians reengaged with modal issues from the 1960s. For example, Aristotle once again came to be taken seriously by those anxious to avoid what they saw as the unwanted metaphysical consequences of Russellian extensionalism in logic when applied to modal logic. Hegel’s views, however, have never been reexamined in a similar way. In this paper, I argue that in his account of judgment in his Science of Logic, Hegel offers an approach that is very different to that portrayed by Russell. In particular, it is an approach that offers novel ways of thinking about puzzling issues concerning the logical treatment of tense and modality—topics that have become central to mainstream debates

Epistemology · Hegelianism · Linguistics · Modality (human–computer interaction) · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil

Tools

Open DOILibgen