Life as Ground, and the Limits of the Subjective Concept

Bibliographic Data

ID23652174
AuthorsKaren Ng (0000-0002-1265-3522, corresponding author)
Year2020
Pages165-218
Publication date2020-03-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueHegels Concept of Life (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University PressNew York (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/oso/9780190947613.003.0005
OpenAlexW3006871812
ISBN9780190947613
LanguageEN
References cited87

Chapter 5 argues that the Subjective Logic can be read as Hegel’s “critique of judgment” by turning to the importance of Hölderlin. Adopting Hölderlin’s understanding of judgment as “original division,” Hegel traces the ground of judgment not to the original unity of “Being” but to what he calls “the original judgment of life” (das ursprüngliche Urteil des Lebens). What this denotes is an original form of activity, an original division and unity, that opens up intelligibility as such. This chapter argues that organic unity and form provide a standard for the unity and form of Concept, judgment, and syllogism. The key to this argument hinges on Hegel’s understanding of Gattung-concepts (a genus, species, or kind) as the objective, universal context of judgment. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of the “Judgment” chapter in particular, and argues that what Hegel calls the judgment of the Concept (essentially, evaluative judgments) is modeled on Kant’s understanding of reflective, teleological judgments.

Common ground · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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