The Empirical Issues in Functional Explanations in the Social Sciences

Bibliographic Data

ID20054040
AuthorsHope Kincaid (0000-0001-5032-815X, corresponding author), Harold Kincaid
Year2020
Pages18-27
Publication date2020-03-09
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueSocial Functions in Philosophy (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.4324/9780429435393-2
OpenAlexW3011792940
ISBN9780429435393
LanguageEN
Citations received15
References cited1

Since at least the 19th century, social scientists have asserted that various social phenomena are explained by their functions and the purposes they serve. Marx, for example, thought the state exists in order to promote the interests of the ruling class. Of course, functional explanations in the social sciences have been quite puzzling to commentators. This chapter shows how functional explanation in the social sciences can be explicated, why some standard objections are wrong, what might count as evidence for functional explanations, and some open and interesting questions about them. There are at least two distinct notions of functions or functional explanation invoked in these explanations. The first notion describes the roles social practices play, usually as part of some larger social system. The second notion asserts that social practices exist because of their effects, usually because of their beneficial effects

Epistemology · Sociology · Contemporary Sociological Theory and Practice · Philosophy · Psychology · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research

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