Acting as the virtuous person acts
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20063455 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bernard Williams (corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Pages | 13-33 |
| Publication date | 2018-03-08 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | CHAPTER |
| Venue | Aristotle and Moral Realism (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Routledge (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.4324/9780429502224-2 |
| OpenAlex | W2916493283 |
| ISBN | 9780429502224 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
In this chapter, the author starts from a question that Aristotle raises about virtuous action, and provides what he think should have been Aristotle's answer to it, an answer which he think was also, broadly speaking, Aristotle's own answer. According to Williams, Aristotle's claim that "The virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions 'for their own sake'" should be taken as meaning different things, according to which virtues are in question. In Nicomachean Ethics II.4 Aristotle raises the question of how it can be true, as he claims it to be, that someone becomes just by doing just things: for how can someone do virtuous things without already having the appropriate virtue? Aristotle uses that language of knowledge and of a kind of perception in relation to phronesis. At the end the author ask where this leaves questions of moral realism in relation to such a theory
Economics · Sociology · Virtuous circle and vicious circle · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Communication · Medieval Philosophy and Theology · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.6 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2016 - 2024 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |