The Know‐How of Virtue

Bibliographic Data

ID21497345
AuthorsKathleen Murphy-Hollies (0000-0001-5061-4674, University of Birmingham Birmingham UK, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume41
Issue3
Pages530-548
Publication date2024-07-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Applied Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0264-3758 • E-ISSN: 1468-5930
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/japp.12704
OpenAlexW4388933631
LanguageEN
References cited40

It is widely accepted that virtuous behaviour ought to be motivated in the right way, done for the right reasons, and an appropriate response to the values manifested in a situation. In this article I describe how cases of individuals having poor understanding of the reasons for their behaviour, can nevertheless be conducive to the development of virtue. One way in which giving reasons for one's own behaviour can be inaccurate is when the reasons given are confabulatory. In confabulation, the reasons given for behaviour are post hoc , do not capture factors which actually brought the behaviour in question about, and are not well supported by evidence. Confabulations protect an individual's positive self‐representations at the expense of more accurate appraisals of themselves and the circumstances. However, I argue that engaging in the construction of a positive self‐narrative can be efficacious in making it a reality. Importantly, this is only possible when agents have the know‐how of certain self‐relational skills and attitudes, which are captured in a meta‐virtue of self‐regulation. When individuals can regulate their values and their behaviour effectively, such that they are in keeping, they can ultimately consistently embody virtues. Confabulation can be, and probably often is, part of this process

Cognition · Epistemology · Narrative · Virtue · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology

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