Commentary & Reply

s article "Managing an Unpredictable Moscow" (Parameters, Winter 1999-2000) contains three fundamental errors.It errs in its assumptions, it errs in its methodology, and it errs in the validity of its policy recommendations.The first incorrect assumption is that the Yeltsin era is ending.The Yeltsin era or legacy is a Russia ruled by a superpresidential system lacking checks and balances to restrain executive power.This allowed Yeltsin to rule by decree, initiate two brutal wars in Chechnya, and consolidate the profits of so-called economic reforms into the hands of a hypercorrupt group of oligarchs and "liberal" reformers.Instead of creating the foundation of a liberal democratic society, it negated progress toward limited government, rule of law, protection of individual rights, and transparency in business dealings.The Yeltsin era will continue into the indefinite future because it will benefit whichever clique holds the presidency.The second incorrect assumption is that Vladimir Putin is only a transitional figure.Here I am not talking specifically about Putin himself as the new President, but about Putin as a representation of the type of persons who are now ascendant in the Russian government.The past three prime ministers of Russia have all been drawn from its security services--the successors of the KGB.Recent events indicate that the Russian military has reached a level of influence in policymaking circles possibly unprecedented in Russian or Soviet history.The ascent of this Chekist/military influence in the Russian government, by persons whose formative years were spent in the most loyal and highly propagandized bodies of the Soviet Union, is not transitional because those persons have integrated themselves into the ruling structures of the Russian Federation.The 1999 parliamentary election demonstrated that Putin was very popular even among many "reformers."While some view this coalition as a victory for "centrist" forces, in reality the so-called reformers have surrendered liberal democratic principles for a small share of power in the super-presidential system.Their need for Putin to continue with past "reforms" is essentially a need to make sure they can keep what has been stolen to date.Putin and his like are far from transitory figures because there is no politician or coalition in Russia today with the power to unseat him in an election, deter him in the Duma, or even challenge him in the court of public opinion via access to a free and independent media.I also disagree with Dr. Weitz's use of a typical bureaucratic methodology, presenting left, right, and center options for the future and supporting the most neutral one, for three reasons.First, he has minimized the negatives of the centrists.Dr. Weitz stated that future centrist governments will be similar to Yeltsin's, with "a commitment to Western-style liberal democracy, limited economic reforms, and the devolution of substantial authority to regional officials."He contrasts this with a possible communist government which he believes would "restrict press freedoms and other liberties traditionally associated with Western liberal democracies."But under Yeltsin, Western-style liberal democracy did not flourish, and elections have been manipulated to provide a democratic veneer for an increasingly authoritarian state.Not only is the KGB being resurrected, but many of the freedoms that Weitz believes the communists would restrict have already been restricted by the "centrists."The second error was to mitigate the foreign policy actions of the centrists and not see that they are almost identical to the possible foreign policy actions he fears from a future nationalist government.By exploiting ethnic tensions in the

Law and economics · Political science · Sociology · European Politics and Security · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics · Russia and Soviet political economy