Epistemic truth and excluded middle

Bibliographic Data

ID20141839
AuthorsCESARE COZZO (0000-0001-5284-0077, Sapienza University of Rome, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume64
Issue2-3
Pages243-282
Publication date1998-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.1998.tb00189.x
OpenAlexW2087462897
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited35

Can an epistemic conception of truth and an endorsement of the excluded middle (together with other principles of classical logic abandoned by the intuitionists) cohabit in a plausible philosophical view? In PART I I describe the general problem concerning the relation between the epistemic conception of truth and the principle of excluded middle. In PART II I give a historical overview of different attitudes regarding the problem. In PART III I sketch a possible holistic solution. Part I The Problem §1. The epistemic conception of truth. The epistemic conception of truth can be formulated in many ways. But the basic idea is that truth is explained in terms of epistemic notions, like experience, argument, proof, knowledge, etc. One way of formulating this idea is by saying that truth and knowability coincide, i.e. for every statement S

Citation · Library science · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

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