Pursuit of the concept of validity

A dialogue

Bibliographic Data

ID20142328
AuthorsCESARE COZZO (0000-0001-5284-0077, Department of Philosophy Sapienza University of Rome Rome Italy, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume90
Issue5
Pages479-491
Publication date2024-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12538
OpenAlexW4399761857
LanguageEN
References cited30

This is a dialogue between Lisa and Max on Dag Prawitz's work concerning the concept of deductive validity. Lisa first explains Prawitz's criticisms of the presently prevailing non‐epistemic analyses of validity. Then Lisa describes three different ways in which Prawitz attempted to develop an epistemic concept of validity. Max asks questions for clarification, raises some objections and compares Prawitz's three approaches with other lines of thought. Two inference rules are specially discussed: disjunction introduction and ex contradictione quodlibet. Max and Lisa view Prawitz's contribution as part of a variegated, ongoing research pursuing an explication of the concept of validity, which began with the Socratic and Platonic distinction between merely persuasive arguments and good arguments and with Aristotle's definition of syllogism. Throughout the history of philosophy, logicians have aimed at clarifying a pre‐theoretic idea of good deduction and have proposed, criticized, refined, adjusted precise theoretical concepts of validity. Prawitz has criticized current views about validity, has advanced new proposals and revised them. His work is an important chapter of the long pursuit of the concept of validity

Cognitive science · Epistemology · Formal Methods in Verification · Logic, programming, and type systems · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Psychology

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