No Luck in the Distance
A Reply to Freitag
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20141856 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (0000-0001-6472-2684, KU Leuven, corresponding author), Fernando Broncano‐Berrocal (KU Leuven) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-100 |
| Publication date | 2016-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12078 |
| OpenAlex | W1574872301 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 11 |
In a recent article in this journal, W olfgang F reitag argues that G ettier‐style cases that are based on the notion of “distant” epistemic luck cannot be ruled out as cases of knowledge by modal conditions such as safety or sensitivity. I argue that (1) safety and sensitivity can be easily fixed and that (2) F reitag provides no convincing reason for the existence of “distant” epistemic luck
Epistemology · Luck · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,1 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2016 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |