The myth of true lies

Bibliographic Data

ID20141869
AuthorsJesper Kallestrup (0000-0002-3445-8509, University of Aberdeen—Philosophy Aberdeen Scotland, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume89
Issue4
Pages451-466
Publication date2023-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12466
OpenAlexW4377137841
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited49

Suppose you assert a proposition p that you falsely believe to be false with the intention to deceive your audience. The standard view has it that you lied. This paper argues against orthodoxy: deceptive lying requires that p be in actual fact false, in addition to your intention to deceive by means of untruthfully asserting that p . We proceed as follows. First, an argument is developed for such falsity condition as the non‐psychological component of lying. The problem with the standard view, we profess, is exactly that lying is a purely psychological relation between disbelief, assertion, and intention. Then, by scrutinising familiar cases, we revisit the alleged intuitive support for the existence of true lies. It turns out these intuitions can be explained away once we reflect on the characteristic deceptive hallmarks that are associated with the distinction between lying and botched attempts at lying. Finally, we examine the morality of lying in the light of said falsity condition. The resultant view emphasises our moral sensitivity to the practical consequences of acts of lying, while still accommodating those moral considerations that pertain exclusively to the psychological components of lying

Argument (complex analysis) · Assertion · Deception · Epistemology · Falsity · Lying · Morality · Orthodoxy · Theology · Computer Science · Deception detection and forensic psychology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology