Foreknowledge and causal determinism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20141930 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Martin Fischer (0000-0002-1685-4743, University of California Riverside California USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2025-04-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12560 |
| OpenAlex | W4402762333 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 19 |
I evaluate Patrick Todd's critique of the idea accepted by many, including (in contemporary philosophy) Nelson Pike and John Martin Fischer, that there can be non‐causal constraints on human actions (including basic actions). I suggest that Todd's critical reflections, although illuminating, are not persuasive. I defend non‐causal constraints in part by putting forward an interpretation of the intuitive idea of the fixity of the past following Carl Ginet: our freedom is the power to add to the given past
Determinism · Epistemology · Foreknowledge · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citations per year | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2025 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |