Frege on Anti‐Psychologism and the Role of Logic in Thinking

Bibliographic Data

ID20141960
AuthorsThomas Lockhart (0000-0002-4456-0355, Auburn University, corresponding author)
Year2016
Volume82
Issue4
Pages302-328
Publication date2016-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12101
OpenAlexW2469148211
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited12

According to (what I call) the Explanatory Problem with Frege's Platonism about Thoughts, the sharp separation between the psychological and the logical on which Frege famously insists is too sharp, leaving Frege no resources to show how it could be legitimate to invoke logical laws in an explanation of our activities of thinking. I argue that there is room in Frege's philosophy for such justificatory explanations. To see how, we need first to understand correctly the lesson of Frege's attack on psychologism as fundamentally marking a contrast between justification and explanation, and, second, we must take Frege to be committed to the idea that the laws of truth are normatively constitutive for the process of thinking

Epistemology · Intuitionism · Platonism · Principle of compositionality · Psychologism · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History

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