Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought I

Bibliographic Data

ID4079618
AuthorsDaniele Mezzadri (0000-0002-3441-3546, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume10
Issue9
Pages583-591
Publication date2015-09-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy Compass (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phc3.12248
OpenAlexW4242937724
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited18

This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege's philosophy of logic. In Section 1 of Part I, I discuss Frege's view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking and is therefore a normative science. In Section 2, I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence, the tension: the view according to which logic is normative for thought seems to be incompatible with the idea that abiding by the laws of logic forms a precondition for thought. In Section 1 of Part II, I survey a number of interpretations of Frege's conception of logic that deal with this question. I show that they are for the most part either normative readings (emphasising the former understanding of the nature of logic) or constitutive readings (emphasising the latter). Finally, in Section 2, I adjudicate the debate and aim at reconciling the normative and the constitutive strands in Frege's conception of logic

Adjudication · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Normative · Philosophy of logic · Political science · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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