A Proof‐Theoretic Account of the Miners Paradox
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142273 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ansten Klev (0000-0003-1091-284X, Czech Academy of Sciences, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 82 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 351-369 |
| Publication date | 2016-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12090 |
| OpenAlex | W2341116712 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 18 |
By maintaining that a conditional sentence can be taken to express the validity of a rule of inference, we offer a solution to the Miners Paradox that leaves both modus ponens and disjunction elimination intact. The solution draws on Sundholm's recently proposed account of Fitch's Paradox
Calculus (dental) · Epistemology · Inference · Linguistics · Mathematical economics · Modus ponens · Rule of inference · Sentence · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Defaults in update semantics
Epistemic Modals
Constructions, proofs and the meaning of logical constants
Proofs as Acts and Proofs as Objects
What we know and what to do
Semantic Values for Natural Deduction Derivations
Does the deduction theorem fail for modal logic
The cognitive act and the first-person perspective
Ifs and Oughts
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |