Zombies Incorporated
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142294 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Olof Leffler (0000-0001-9073-2552, Universität Wien Vienna Austria, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 640-659 |
| Publication date | 2023-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12484 |
| OpenAlex | W4383878290 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 41 |
How should we understand the relation between corporate agency, corporate moral agency and corporate moral patienthood? For some time, corporations have been treated as increasingly ontologically and morally sophisticated in the literature. To explore the limits of this treatment, I start off by redeveloping and defending a reductio that historically has been aimed at accounts of corporate agency which entail that corporations count as moral patients. More specifically, I argue that standard agents are due a certain type of moral concern, but corporate agents are not due that type of concern, so they are not agents of, at least, the standard type. Diagnosis: because corporations plausibly lack qualia, they are ‘zombie agents’ that mimic real agents. This explains why they are neither standard agents nor standard moral patients: they are not standard agents because they lack mental states, and because they lack experiences, they are, at best, morally notable rather than morally respectable. However, I then argue that we nevertheless have instrumental reasons to include them in our moral responsibility practices, both because that is what notability involves and bluffingly, and both when it comes to treating them as moral agents and as moral patients. Hence, we may treat corporations as part of our moral responsibility practices to a limited extent anyway
Agency (philosophy) · Business · Compatibilism · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Moral agency · Moral responsibility · Morality · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Collective and Corporate Responsibility
Social Ontology
Agents of Justice
Internal and external reasons
Action, Knowledge, and Will
Should Corporations Have the Right to Vote? A Paradox in the Theory of Corporate Moral Agency
Eliminating Group Agency
Group Agents and Moral Status
Collective Intentions and Actions
Group Agency
“If You Tickle Us….”
What Is It Like to Be a Bat
Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents
The Bounds of Agency An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
I, Volkswagen
Contemporary British Philosophy
The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald's Claim to Rights
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2 |
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |