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Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4758249 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Collin (0000-0003-0949-1072, Australian Catholic University, corresponding author), Stephanie Collins (0000-0003-3417-2321, Australian Catholic University) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 283-304 |
| Publication date | 2022-03-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqab032 |
| OpenAlex | W4205965479 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 47 |
Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don't hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don't hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call 'moral self-awareness'. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives seem to lack the capacity for moral self-awareness. I solve the problem by giving an account of how collectives have this capacity. The trick is to take seriously individuals' status as flesh-and-blood material constituents of collectives. The idea will be: under certain conditions that I specify, an individual can be the locus of a collective's moral self-awareness. The account provides general insights concerning collectives' dependence on members, the boundaries of membership, and the locus of collectives' phenomenology
Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Mental capacity · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Collective moral agency and self-induced moral incapacity
The New ‘Parent’ Corporation (Moral Responsibility for Sophisticated AI Systems)
Group blameworthiness and group rights
On the possibility of a normative account of corporate trust
Zombies Incorporated
A Theory of Collective Virtue
Groups that fly blind
Responsibility and Control
Collective and Corporate Responsibility
Responsibility from the Margins
"No Soul to Damn
Responsibility Incorporated
Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?
Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability
The Rationality of Collective Guilt
Social Action
From Plural to Institutional Agency
Group Agency and Individualism
Depoliticizing Democracy
Incompletely Theorized Agreements
Group Duties
Virtual moral agency, virtual moral responsibility
Ethics and consciousness in artificial agents
Group Agency
Against Interpretability
Group Agency, Responsibility, and Control
The location problem in social ontology
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding
Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents
Are My Temporal Parts Agents
But Where Is the University
| Unique citing works | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,75 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |