Agential Knowledge, Action and Process

Bibliographic Data

ID20142545
AuthorsBen Wolfson (University of California, Santa Barbara, corresponding author)
Year2012
Volume78
Issue4
Pages326-357
Publication date2012-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01146.x
OpenAlexW1591775667
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited31

Claims concerning processes, claims of the form “ x is φ ing”, have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form “ x is φ ing” is true when what is happening with x is such that, if it is not interrupted, a φing will occur. It then applies itself more directly to the case of action, arguing that when “ x is φ ing” describes x 's intentional action, it is true iff x is acting from a method she knows to be sufficient to φ, in the sense that if she is not interrupted in carrying out this method, she will φ. I use this criterion to argue that the carbon‐copier example Donald Davidson gives in “Intending” fails to refute Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that an agent who is φing intentionally knows that she is, because the agent in Davidson's example is not intentionally making the copies

Action (physics) · Epistemology · Happening · Process (computing) · Sociology · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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